While reading Sebastian Rödl’s ‘Finite knowledge,’ I started to have a lot of doubts about his and Hilary Putnam’s approach towards skepticism. It did not seem to cohere with what I have learned about what skepticism is, according to Sextus Empiricus. Therefore I read ‘Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Skepticism’ again, which led me to believing that my doubts about Rödl and Putnam were not ungrounded. To have some more in depth arguments, rather than merely arguing what skepticism is, I consulted Georg W.F. Hegel’s approach on the relation between skepticism and philosophy in ‘On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form With the Ancient One.’
In this essay I will discuss the way Rödl and Putnam argue against skepticism. I will lay out their argumentation and then I will react to it with arguments from Empiricus and I will also use some arguments that find their origin in how Hegel relates skepticism to philosophy. Rödl and Putnam believe that skepticism leads to the impossibility to know anything. I will discuss that this is not the case, for skepticism has entirely different goals and does not mean to refute knowledge in itself. Skepticism is a movement against dogmatism and common sense rather than a movement against philosophy. Not only do I think that skepticism does not abolish knowledge, I am also going to suggest how skepticism could lead to an extension of philosophy, if not the potential infinitude of knowledge. I will argue that rather than showing that knowledge is impossible, skepticism suspends judgment and in this suspension of judgment lies the potentiality to infinite knowledge.
In the text I read, Rödl proposes an argument that intends to show that knowledge is impossible. This argument is based on two premises. The first premise is that one knows something if and only if one is in a position to give sufficient grounds for it. These grounds can rule out that one is mistaken. The second premise states that no matter what one’s grounds are, there is a possible circumstance such that, if obtained, one’s grounds would not rule out that one is mistaken. This means that given one’s grounds, one could still possibly be mistaken. Hence one’s grounds do not rule out the possibility of being mistaken. So accordingly, whatever one’s grounds are, they would not rule out a circumstance where one is mistaken. Rödl states that according to the first premise, one does not know and according to the two premises altogether it is impossible to know anything.
Rödl then discusses how Putnam wants to show, in what way that argument is invalid by explaining that the fault lies in the premises. Putnam objects that, in order to know, it is not necessary to be in a position that rules out all circumstances in which one could find error in knowing. He says that we only have to rule out those circumstances that are relevant. In using the word ‘know’, a statement of the form X knows Y does not claim that X is in a position to abolish every possible doubt. He states that when we say we know something, that we mean that we can rule out relevant doubts, but not all possible doubts. With this argumentation Putnam tries to reject the first premise.
Rödl however, thinks that this is a wrong use of the word ‘know.’ He says that someone can not rule out that circumstances come by, under which one’s claim is false. The possibility that these circumstances may be irrelevant to the given situation, does not give one a position to exclude them. It rather means that someone may know something, while he is possibly mistaken. One may know something, while at the same time it is possible that things are not as he knows them to be.
Putnam holds to the argument that in order to know, one does not need to be in a position to exclude all possibilities of error. This is contrary to the skeptic, who demands that every possibility is excluded. Putnam states that it suffices to exclude some possibilities, but this statement seems to show that the skeptic demands more of knowledge than Putnam does. He says that one is able to scrap some doubts, because he thinks that doubts need justification in order to be considered. If this is the case, one then would only need to exclude that things are a certain way, only if there is some justification for thinking they are that way. Undermining the first premise of the original argument, doubt requiring justification, thus limits the amount of possibilities one must exclude to know.
Rödl does not deny that doubt, sometimes, requires justification. He does however deny that this lends support to the idea that grounds may be sufficient for knowledge while failing to exclude error. Putnam, on the contrary, states that grounds are sufficient if they exclude only relevant possibilities of error. For both, the reasons stated above and because some possibilities are irrelevant, hence they are just too far-fetched, he says that some possibilities have no grounds for thinking that they would occur.
This however does not leave out the ability that they could possibly occur, I will argue this later from the skeptical perspective and Hegel’s view on general claims.
Putnam also states that in general, one may be in a position to rule certain things out, not on a basis of sensible experience, but purely by way of knowing what happens in general. By knowing what people do and what they would not do or what would happen and what would usually not happen in certain circumstances.
Rödl says something about this too, he states that when this is the case, the excluding proposition differs in logical form from the proposition it excludes. What is being excluded is general and atemporal. The general statement supports modal particular statements. Hence, only validating the skeptical argument more.
In addition, Rödl says that these ordinary claims never hold without exception. These claims are about what happens or is done in general and what happens in general is not what always happens. These are not laws, more like Aristotle’s sublunary laws. Those are the laws that do not determine what always happens, but only what happens in general.
Rödl and Putnam seem to agree that the structure of human knowledge can be explained as knowing the particular through the general. They also seem to claim that they know the skeptic’s conception of knowledge. Putnam claims that the skeptic fails to acknowledge the structure of human knowledge. He states that the skeptic’s argument, described as above in the two premises, distorts the concept of knowledge as it applies to humans. He thinks the first argument is the cause of this distortion, whereas it appears to be conceptual, for it articulates what it is to know. Putnam does agree with the second premise, he thinks that it is factual and that it seems to express a discovery about the limited powers of our grounds.
Rödl agrees with Putnam on the claim that the skeptic fails to acknowledge the structure of human knowledge. He identified this structure as one knowing the particular through the general as well. He claims that if the skeptic would deny this, his denial must be expressed in his argument. And since it is not expressed by the first premise, it must be expressed by the second premise. However in that case, the second premise would not be factual, but it would impose a condition on knowledge that is beyond human.
In this argument both Rödl and Putnam seem to claim that skepticism abolishes knowledge, for they claim that in skepticism there is no knowledge attainable through the general. I would like to show that the skeptic, in its roots, does not wish to abolish knowledge, but rather wishes to suspend the judgment of knowledge.
Since the skeptic is not able to say which of the things proposed he should find convincing and not convincing. He uses the suspension of judgment. The skeptic therefore tries to clarify that objects appear to us equal in the sense of both the object’s convincingness and their lack of it. The skeptic does not assert that they are equal, rather the skeptic says what appears to them about the object of knowledge, when the object makes an impression. The skeptic neither wants to posit nor deny anything, because the tantamount of the matters require more proper investigation. This is where the suspension of judgment gets its name from, namely from the fact that the intellect is suspended.
Therefore one could say that, hence the skeptic does not aim to posit or reject anything, the skeptic does not posit or reject knowledge, but rather suspends the judgment, for they still think that certain claims of how this knowledge appears require more investigation.
Hegel also shows that skepticism is not aimed at philosophy, but rather at dogmatism. He describes the skeptic suspension of judgment as a weapon against dogmatism on finite bases. He also says that they are useless against philosophy. When taken philosophy per definition, being the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality and existence, skepticism would be useless in making claims against knowledge. He says that directed against dogmatism, suspension of judgment appears to belong to reason and must necessarily be victorious over dogmatism. Directed against philosophy however, suspension of judgment belongs to reflection. Making it fall apart internally and forces it to become dogmatic in itself. The suspension of judgment is in and for itself, according to Hegel, not directed against rational thinking. When it is directed upon it, it would immediately alter the rational.
I think therefore that the argument that Rödl proposes in his text should not be towards the skeptic abolishing knowledge, but rather towards suspending its judgment. This can be seen more elaborately in what Empiricus says about the intentions of the skeptic.
He says that whoever says that skeptics reject what is apparent, have not listened to what the skeptics say. They do not overturn anything which leads them to agree to things in accordance with a passive appearance. When they investigate whether things exist, such as they appear, they do grant that they appear. What they investigate is not what is apparent, but what is said about what is apparent. So when speaking of knowledge of an object, they do not make claims about knowledge itself, nor do they make claims about the object. They rather investigate what is said about knowledge, about the object and about the relation of knowledge to the object as it appears to them.
If, however, the skeptics do propose arguments directly against something ostensible, it is not because they desire to reject what is apparent, but rather because they want to unveil the rashness of the dogmatist. They believe that it is significant to keep observing uncertain matters in order to avoid being led into false conclusions when following dogma’s in one’s reasoning.
This is a good reason, not necessarily an argument, against Putnam’s doubts that require justification. In view of the fact that he reasons from dogma, he says that we can base our grounds for doubt on things that happen in general. But reasoning from the things that happen in general is precisely what the skeptics try to avoid, for these beliefs of the general could lead to rashness in reason. So it appears that in his argumentation, not only does Putnam grab the premises by the rear end, he also tries to solve it exactly the way that the skeptic is fundamentally against.
Hegel clarifies this more, he states that the suspension of judgment is aimed against dogmatism of ordinary common sense. The suspension of judgment is not at all concerned with reason and its cognition, rather it only concerns the finite and the understanding or cognition of the finite throughout. The modes of suspending judgment are themselves partly empirical, hence they do not apply to a priori speculations. It however, concerns relationships in general, it concerns the fact that everything actual is conditioned by something else and in that measure it expresses a principle of reason.
Consequently, Hegel says, skepticism is in no way directed against philosophy,- and thus as stated earlier, not against knowledge,- but against ordinary common sense. It is aimed against the ordinary consciousness, which always holds on to what is given. Whether it be facts or finite objects, the ordinary common sense will stick to it as certain, secure and sometimes even eternal.
I think this strongly attacks Putnam’s idea of doubts and doubts without justification. It puts Putnam in the position of an ordinary consciousness, who holds fast to his general claims about what he knows people do or would do and his claims about what he knows what usually happens. I believe Rödl agrees on this when he says that general laws cannot be used, for they do not attain certainty.
The skeptical suspension of judgment shows that common sense leads to the instability of this kind of certainty, for the certainty that we speak of in terms of common sense is not always certain. The skeptic explains this by staying close to the explanation of the ordinary consciousness. The explanation likewise calls upon appearances and finite cases for help, however then recognizes their untruth by showing their diversity along with the fact that all these situations are equal in their right to count as valid.
Putnam does not take every doubt as equally valid and therefore opposes the true meaning and aim of skepticism again in his argumentation against what is not the skeptic’s aim.
Another reason why I believe skepticism does not aim at the abolishment of knowledge is because skepticism can be considered as the start of philosophy according to Hegel. Not only is it the start, I also came to believe that there is a potentiality in skepticism that could lead to infinite knowledge through philosophy.
What led me to believe that skepticism is able to extend philosophy was the claim that skepticism made one of their fundamental principles, namely that for every account an equivalent account is opposed. Empiricus elaborates this by stating that skepticism can be used to set out oppositions among ostensible things and among things that are thought of, not excluding any thing. This is due to the tantamount in the opposed objects and accounts. When saying ‘opposed accounts’ Empiricus does not have assertions and denials in mind, rather we can simply read it in terms of ‘conflicting accounts.’ With tantamount I aim at the equality that concerns whether the account is convincing or not, for which I argued earlier that none of the conflicting accounts can outweigh any other as being more or less convincing. When they say ‘every account’ they do not mean every single possible account, they merely speak of accounts that they have inspected, not of an infinite amount of possibilities that they have considered, such as Putnam suggests. In addition, Hegel says that all genuine philosophical theories either have this negative side to them or sublate to the principle of contradiction. Therefore anyone, for any philosophy, can present for himself a skepticism.
So to sum up my arguments for this theory, every philosophy can be contradicted for skepticism can show an opposing account. They however hold no beliefs in this opposing account, it is simply showing that there is no certainty in the original account. Every negative account should have a positive reaction, if one wants to maintain their account. However, skepticism could refute this with an opposing account again. This could suggest that there is no room for actual knowledge, however I have argued that this is not what the skeptic aims at. Hegel even showed that genuine philosophy would hold its grounds against this form of skepticism.
Then why do I believe that skepticism could potentially lead to infinite knowledge? I would like to show this by using tables. Let’s say that we have a theory, ‘Theory 1,’ for which consequently exists an opposing account. It could be shown as such:
| Theory 1 | |
| Opposed account of Theory 1 |
One would obviously want to defend their theory against the opposed account, for which they will create a new theory or an adjusted theory, which I will call ‘Theory 2.’
| Theory 1 | Theory 2 |
| Opposed account 1 |
This theory could, according to skepticism, be opposed by an equally convincing theory.
| Theory 1 | Theory 2 |
| Opposed account of Theory 1 | Opposed account of Theory 2 |
I believe that when this opposing theory is proposed, it makes room for a new theory X and thus for more new knowledge.
| Theory 1 | Theory 2 | (Room for new Theory X) |
| Opposed account of Theory 1 | Opposed account of Theory 2 | (Room for opposed account of new Theory X) |
Consequently, this room can be filled again, for there is a need for a new theory. These steps could be repeated ad infinitum.
To explain this in another way, for every theory that is proposed, skepticism will be able to raise an opposing theory, which will contain new questions about the relevant theory. Obviously, when new questions are raised, we, being philosophers, will require new answers and in these answers one will find new knowledge. If we don’t, philosophy would come to a halt. So whenever philosophy or a theory ends, skepticism will be able to bring new life to it by raising new questions. For every opposing theory, a new or adjusted theory can be formed, which then in turn can be opposed again. Hence, philosophy can keep continuing to exist, hand in hand with skepticism. This does not yet prove that skepticism leads to infinite knowledge, therefore a lot more would be required, such as proving the possibility of infinite knowledge through finite thinkers and proving that knowledge can be infinite itself. One would also have to take a lot of other things in consideration, such as the temporality of knowledge and again, that the theory could be opposed by skeptics. These are examples among many other requirements and considerations. It does however show that skepticism extends and will keep on extending the limits of knowledge in philosophy.
One could argue however, that this is more of a hindrance towards new knowledge, for it refutes every theory. Despite the given argument, I think that in every step we come a little bit closer to the truth, for we abolish previous doubts with every new theory. Despite that, if philosophical theory would end, there would be no more need for knowledge and this seems undesirable, if not implausible.
I have shown that there are some misconceptions about skepticism within the argumentation that Rödl proposes. Most of what both Rödl and Putnam have to say either does not suffice with the general meaning and aims of skepticism, as Empiricus describes it, or can be refuted by skepticism. Skepticism does not aim at abolishing knowledge, it suspends judgment of knowledge and in doing so it merely wants to protect the thinker and the truth of the rashness dogmatism can bring when not investigated correctly. If this does not happen one could lay claims such as Putnam did, saying that not every possibility is to be considered equally valuable. Skepticism thus aims at dogmatism rather than at philosophy. I can also conclude that skepticism leads to new insights within philosophy. We should almost thank the skeptic for refuting our theory, for they might address things we have overlooked, hence we can make our theory stronger. Whether skepticism leads to infinite knowledge remains undecided, so therefore my theory remains what it is, a theory.